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ABSTRACT 
This article analyses how social preference towards environmental costs for addressing environmental 
concerns can have an impact on the steady state solution concerning the stock of accumulative 
pollutants and the optimal environmental regulatory stringency as well as on the initial value of the 
optimal environmental regulatory stringency that leads to the steady state solution. The results found 
that the steady state value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency was higher, and the 
steady-state value of the stock of accumulative pollutants was lower in the case where sufficient 
liability costs for environmental damages were estimated, compared with the case where the 
estimation of liability costs was insufficient. In addition, the results showed that the steady-state value 
of optimal environmental regulatory stringency was higher and the value of the stock of accumulative 
pollutants was lower in the case where the discount rate provided sufficient consideration for future 
generations, than when the discount rate provided insufficient consideration. Moreover, the study also 
indicated that, where the initial value of the stock of accumulative pollutants was within a given 
range, in the cases where sufficient liability costs for environmental damages were estimated and 
where the discount rate provided sufficient consideration for future generations, the initial value of the 
optimal environmental regulatory stringency was found to be at a higher level, compared to the initial 
value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency for the cases where there was insufficient 
estimation of liability costs and when the discount rate provided insufficient consideration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The pollution from various toxic substances which is often a by-product of production and 
industrialization can be a threat to the environment. Heavy metals such as mercury and 
cadmium; radioactive contamination caused by accidents or wastes from nuclear power 
stations; dioxins which is considered to impact endocrine disruptors; and global warming by 
greenhouse gases, are all growing social concerns. These pollutants which accumulate over 
time are referred to be the main causes of environmental degradation [1, 2]. In recent years, 
providing for both intergenerational and intra-generational equity which are vital principles 
of sustainability and taking into consideration the trend of environmentalism, the effects of 
such accumulative pollutants on the environment cannot be ignored. Accordingly, it would be 
necessary to appropriately understand how these accumulative pollutants and environmental 
policies which could be related to these pollutants change over time. Environmental costs 
which could affect accumulative pollutants would be important to examine along with how 
social planners consider the social preference towards environmental costs. The reason is that 
under a competitive market, it is considered that the social benefit is larger when social costs 
related to environmental issues are internalized compared to when the costs are ignored [3]. It 
is also considered that firms could receive benefits such as maintaining a strong brand image, 
enhance productivity and profitability and establish stronger social/stakeholders relationships 
when they have appropriate consideration for environmental costs and there are previous 
researches supporting this [4-6]. 
The environmental costs, here, are composed of liability costs for environmental damages 
and abatement costs. As for the abatement costs, it can be regarded as ex-ante costs that 
prevent pollution. These are costs necessary to reduce the volume of residuals emitted into 
the environment or to reduce the ambient concentrations [7]. They also include costs for 
pollution prevention, environmental preservation and the investment, administration, and 
transaction to support this. For example, activities such as changes in production 
technologies, input switching, recycling and treatment are covered in these costs [7]. With 
regards to the liability costs for environmental damages, they include environmental loss 
costs, environmental loss mitigation costs, environmental restoration costs, related 
administration costs and transaction costs. Concerning the estimation of liability costs, this 
will be regarded as “sufficient liability costs for environmental damages” when the private 
interests, which contain both rights to live and property rights; and the public interests from 
living organisms and their surrounding; and the intrinsic values of the environment are 
included. However, only a portion of the “sufficient liability costs for environmental 
damages” are usually covered. Holl and Howarth [8] identify a number of cases where 
environmental restoration costs were not adequately covered. Yoshimura [9] identified the 
lack of a system for administrators and citizens to play a role in the restoration of the 
environment, which implies that environmental restoration costs have not been adequately 
considered [9]. Moreover, there are cases where the compensation costs for environmental 
losses were not adequately paid [10, 11]. According to Otsuka [12], the effectiveness of the 
conciliation is limited to the settlement agreement and it does not impact the proceedings of 
the trial, which could be considered that the compensation fees were insufficient. 
Furthermore, with regards to laws related to environmental compensation, it is recognised 
that there are challenges for the compensation to cover the public interests which include 
living organisms and their surroundings and the intrinsic value of the environment [9]. When 
such liability costs for environmental damages are not sufficiently covered, we will consider 
this as “insufficient liability costs for environmental damages.” In this research we will 




It is necessary to estimate environmental costs which are composed of abatement costs and 
liability costs for environmental damages from the viewpoint of not only the present 
generation but also with consideration for future generations. This leads to the important 
consideration of the discount rates adopted when estimating environmental costs. Therefore, 
in this article, we will analyse the discount rates adopted for both insufficient and sufficient 
consideration of future generations. In the former case where there is insufficient 
consideration, there is the tendency to estimate lower environmental costs compared to the 
latter where the discount rate takes sufficient consideration for future generations and 
estimates higher environmental costs. Accordingly, the discount rate of the former case will 
be higher than the discount rate for the latter case [13-15]. 
Concerning the above, it is considered to be effective to examine the accumulative pollution 
where time proceeds are taken into account, that is, through a dynamic analysis. Numerous 
literature that examine pollutants including accumulative pollutants using the dynamic 
approach exists. For instance, there is literature on the examination of the relationship 
between pollutants and the economy such as economic growth, capital accumulation and 
consumption [16, 17]. There are also past research which study the relationship between 
pollution and the assimilative capacity and the degradation of this capacity under pollution 
excess [18-20]. Moreover, there are large amounts of past literature on the relationship 
between pollution and environmental policies in a dynamic setting. For example, there is a 
study that examine the relationship between tax and subsidy; and pollution flow and stock [17]. 
There are also studies which analyse the relationship between emissions quotas or permit and 
pollution flow and stock [21-23]. Furthermore, Saltari and Travaglini [24] question whether 
there is an intermediate phase where consumers, firms and society anticipate the effects of 
environmental constraints in planning their current economic-ecological decisions and so 
they examine if even an unconstrained regime can have an impact on pollution, by 
anticipating the latent constraint. 
As seen previously, we know that dynamic analysis concerning pollution have been 
conducted from various aspects. The main purpose of this article is to examine the 
differences in the steady state solution and initial values for both the stock of accumulative 
pollutants and the stringency of environmental policies, affected by social preference towards 
environmental costs if a steady state solution exists. Therefore, our analysis will extend the 
study of Chukwuemeka [25] which focuses on both the stock of accumulative pollutants and 
emission tax from a dynamic approach. The study analyses the existence of a steady state 
solution for both the stock of accumulative pollutants and emission tax, their paths in the 
phase diagram, the set of initial values of emission tax, under the framework to minimize 
environmental costs which include liability costs for environmental damages and abatement 
costs. As emphasized before, this article will introduce the aspects of social preference 
towards environmental costs. First, it will examine the differences of the steady state solution 
in the case of sufficient estimation of liability costs for environmental damages and then the 
case of insufficient estimation of liability costs for both the stock of accumulative pollutants 
and the optimal environmental regulatory stringency. Second, similar to the first analysis, this 
article will observe the differences in the steady state solution in the case where the discount 
rate takes sufficient consideration for future generations and in the case where the 
consideration is insufficient for both the stock of accumulative pollutants and the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency. Third, this article also examines, under a given range of 
initial stock of accumulative pollutants, how the initial value of the optimal environmental 
regulatory stringency is decided, depending on the social preference towards environmental 
costs as studied in the first and second analysis. 
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ACCUMULATIVE POLLUTION AND OPTIMAL GROWTH MODEL 
EXPLANATION OF THE BASIC MODEL 
In this section, based on Chukwuemeka [25], we will introduce the framework applied in this 
study. At first, we will confirm the existence of the steady state solution for the stock of 
accumulative pollutants and the optimal environmental regulatory stringency and the possible 
region to be able to move into a steady state solution. To more be specific, given the initial 
value of the stock of accumulative pollutants, and under the condition that abatement 
activities are being conducted, in order to manage environmental costs efficiently, that is, 
when minimizing the total environmental costs which include the liability costs for 
environmental damages and abatement costs, we will identify the existence of the steady state 
solution for the stock of accumulative pollutants and the optimal environmental regulatory 
stringency and the path to the steady state solution. Hence, the objective function and the 
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 ,dSMWS    
 .)0( 0SS   (1) 
Here, S represents the stock of accumulative pollutants, W is the amount of the pollutants 
under the uncontrolled regime, M denote the amount of abatement activities. Quantity d 
(0  d  1) is the rate of decay for the accumulative pollutants. The functional relationship 
between the stocks of pollutants and the rate of decay is little known [20]. Hence, this article 
adopts a constant proportionate rate of decay, which is often used in previous literatures 
concerning pollution stock [20, 25]. Dp(S) is the liability costs for environmental damages. As 
identified by many economists and environmentalists, it assumes that  It also 
assumes that  The p denotes the sufficiency of the consideration for the 
liability costs of environmental damages, which will be explained in the next section.  
represents abatement costs. According to Field and Field [7], it is assumed that 
 since they increase and the marginal costs also increase as the reduction of 
emissions increase.  is the initial value of the stock of accumulative pollutants.  denotes 
the discount rate. The q represents the sufficiency concerning future generation consideration. 
It will be explained in a later section. t means time and the dot on top of the letter (e.g. ) 
represents the differential with respect to t. 
From the previously stated, the present value Hamiltonian is as follows. 
   ).(e )()( dSMWMASDH trp q 

  (2) 
Here, uing the definition  =e
rqt, the current value Hamiltonian is as follows: 
 ).()()( dSMWMASDH p
C    (3) 
Since Dp and A are strictly convex, the current value Hamiltonian is also strictly convex in S 
and M. Accordingly, the following necessary conditions are sufficient. 
 ),('     ,0/ MAMHC    (4) 
   ),()('     ,/)e(e/ drSDtSH qp
trtrC qq 

   (5) 
 ,     ,/ dSMWSSHC    (6) 
Here,  indicates the shadow value of abating one unit of emissions. Since it can be 
interpreted that society will pay for the amount corresponding to the value of abating one unit 
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of emissions, it could be regarded as the optimal environmental regulatory stringency, 
assuming that it could be estimated. Hence, (4) suggests that the increase of marginal cost of 
abating the accumulative pollution represents the increase of the optimal environmental 
regulatory stringency. 
Here, in order to find the steady state, making use of (4), (5), (6), . At first, 
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From  we can find the sign of (8). Next, substitute  into (6), 
 .0 dSMW  (9) 
Rewrite (9),  
 .dSWM   (10) 
Here, substitute (10) into (4), 
 ).(' dSWA   (11) 








From ,0)('' MA i.e. ,0)(''  dSWA  d > 0, we can confirm the sign of (12). From (4), (7) 




, S) as the steady state solution of (S, M, ). 
Since this article aims to focus on the stock of accumulative pollutants and the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency, and to illustrate them in two dimensions, we will focus 
on (S, ). Therefore, with regards to the path to a steady state solution, we will proceed as 
follows. In order to do so, first, we will set ),( S such as .0  That is, from (5), 
.0)()(),( '  drSDS qp    
Fixing   , if it assumes that ,SSa   from (5), we obtain .0/  S  With ,0),(  S  we 
can introduce .0),(  aS  On the other hand, keeping ,   assuming that ,SSb   we attain 
.0/  S  With ,0),(  S  we can make sure ,0),(  S  From these results, in the region 
above ,0 we can confirm ,0),(  S  while in the region below ,0  we can find .0),(  S  
Next, we set )ˆ,ˆ( S  such as .0S  That is, from (6), .0)ˆ,ˆ(  dSMWSSS   Here, as 
)(' MA  is strictly increasing, its inverse is also strictly increasing. Let .)'( 1 vA   By making 
use of (4) and (6), .)()ˆ,ˆ( dSvWSSS    Hence, .0)('/   vS  
Keeping SS ˆ  and supposing that ,̂ a  from 0/  S
  and ,0)ˆ,ˆ( SS  .0),ˆ( aSS 
  On 
the other hand, leaving SS ˆ  and supposing that  ˆb , from 0/  S
  and 0)ˆ,ˆ( SS , 
0)ˆ,ˆ( SS  From these results, we can identify that, in the region above 0S , .0),( SS  
On the other hand we can confirm that, in the region below 0S , .0),( SS  
By summarizing these results, we can obtain the direction of the paths in each region as follows: 
1) in the region which is below 0S  and above 0 , the stock of accumulative pollutants 
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increases and the optimal environmental regulatory stringency also increases as time 
proceeds. Hence, the paths composed of the stock of accumulative pollutants and the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency move towards the upper right direction in the region; 
2) in the region which is below 0S  and below 0 , the stock of accumulative pollutants 
increases and the optimal environmental regulatory stringency also increases as time proceeds. 
Accordingly, the paths composed of the stock of accumulative pollutants and the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency move towards the lower right direction in the region; 
3) in the region which is above 0S  and below 0 , the stock of accumulative pollutants 
increases and the optimal environmental regulatory stringency also increases as time 
proceeds. Hence, the paths composed of the stock of accumulative pollutants and the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency move towards the lower left direction in the region. 
4) in the region which is above 0S  and above 0 , the stock of accumulative pollutants 
increases and the optimal environmental regulatory stringency also increases as time 
proceeds. Therefore, the stock of accumulative pollutants and the optimal environmental 
regulatory stringency move towards the upper left direction in the region. 
STEADY STATE COMPARION BETWEEN SUFFICIENT AND INSUFFICIENT 
LIABILITY COSTS ESTIMATIONS 
Based on the previous results, this section will examine the difference that can occur in terms 
of the steady state solution of the stock of accumulative pollutants and the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency for the case where the liability costs for environmental 
damages estimated are sufficient and the case where those estimates are insufficient. As 
mentioned before, in the case of liability costs for environmental damages through sufficient 
consideration, the estimation includes costs corresponding to not only the private interests 
such as rights to live and property rights but also covers the public interests from living 
organisms and their surrounding and the intrinsic values of the environment. In this case, we 
will define that Dp = Dh (when the liability costs for environmental damages are sufficiently 
estimated). On the other hand, in the case of the liability costs for environmental damages 
estimated through insufficient consideration, it can be considered that the costs representing 
both the private and public interests may not be sufficiently covered. This will be defined as 
Dp = Dl (when the liability costs for environmental damages are insufficiently estimated). 
Taking into consideration the above and past literature that find that only a portion of the 
sufficient liability costs for environmental damages are usually covered and compensation 
costs for environmental losses are not adequately paid [8-12], the estimation of the liability 
costs for the case of sufficient estimation will be larger than those in the case of insufficient 
estimation. Hence, it assumes that the estimation of the liability costs for environmental 
damages in the former case are larger than those in the latter case with any amount of stock of 
accumulative pollutants. i.e. Dh(S) > Dl(S) for 0 < S. It also assumes that Dh(0) = Dl(0) = 0. 
Accordingly, 
 ).()( '''' SDSD lh   (13) 













h  (14) 
Since this section and the next section only focuses on the differences between the case of 
sufficient estimations of liability costs for environmental damages and the case of insufficient 
estimations, for convenience, it assumes that the discount rates are identical in both cases. 
Hence, from (12) and (14), we can draw Figure 1. 0  refers to the stock of accumulative 
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Figure 1. Steady state solutions in the case of sufficient estimation of liability costs for 
environmental damages and in the case of insufficient estimation of liability costs for 
environmental damages. 
pollutants under the steady state; 𝑆𝑝h indicates the stock of accumulative pollutants at the steady 
state when the estimations of liability costs are sufficient; and 𝑆𝑝l indicates the stock of 
accumulative pollutants at the steady state when the estimations of liability costs are insufficient. 
As seen in Figure 1, we can find that in the case where liability costs for environmental 
damages are sufficiently estimated, which include both costs covering the public and private 
interests, the steady state value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency are higher 
and the stock of accumulative pollutants are lower, than compared with the case of 
insufficient estimation of liability costs for environmental damages. That is, this steady state 
could be regarded as the steady state solution of high environmental consideration. On the 
contrary, in the case of insufficient estimation of liability costs for environmental damages, 
the steady state value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency are lower, and the 
stock of accumulative pollutants are higher, than compared with the case of sufficient 
estimation of liability costs. Hence, this state could be interpreted as the steady state solution 
of low environmental consideration. 
DIFFERENCE IN THE INITIAL VALUE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
– COMPARING SUFFICIENT AND INSUFFICIENT LIABILITY COSTS ESTIMATIONS 
Next, in this section, we will examine, under the condition that the initial value of the stock of 
accumulative pollutants is within a given range, how the initial value of the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency in the case of sufficient estimation of liability costs for 
environmental damages differs from the case of insufficient estimation of liability costs for 
environmental damages. To describe more precisely, under the condition that the initial value 
of the stock of accumulative pollutants is within a given range, this section will analyse how 
the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the steady 
state solution of high environmental consideration differs from one which leads to the steady 
state solution of low environmental consideration. The reason for analysing this is that we can 
observe how the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency is set in order 
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Figure 2. Initial values of the optimal environmenal regulatory stringency under S1 < S0 < Sph 
for both sufficient and insufficient estimations of liability costs for environmental damages. 
compared to the steady state solution of lower environmental consideration, given that the 
initial value of the stock of accumulative pollutants is within a given range and under the 
condition that the social preference towards the consideration of liability costs for 
environmental damages does not change over time in each of the cases. 
In Figure 2, S1 represents the stock of accumulative pollutants at the steady state with 
sufficient estimation of liability cost (Dp = Dh) and at the level of environmental regulations 
stringency (pl) obtained under the steady state of the stock of accumulative pollutants 
( 0S ) and the steady state with insufficient estimation of liability costs (Dp = Dl). As seen 
in Figure 2, given S1 < S0 < Sph, concerning the case of sufficient estimation of liability costs 
for environmental damages, from the result of 1), the initial value of the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the steady state solution can be set within 
the range of 1 < h0
~  < ph. On the other hand, given S1 < S0 < Sph, concerning the case of 
insufficient estimation of liability costs, from the result of 1), the initial value of the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the steady state solution can be set within 
the range of 2 < l0
~  < pl. From Figure 2, we can identify 2 < l0
~  < pl < 1 < h0
~  < ph. From 
transitivity, l0
~  < .
~
0h  That is, when sufficient liability costs for environmental damages are 
covered, the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency that leads to the steady state 
of high environmental consideration, is at a higher level than the initial optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency when the estimation of the liability costs are insufficient 
and leads to a steady state of low environmental consideration. Accordingly, when 
insufficient liability costs for environmental damages are covered, the initial optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency that leads to the steady state of low environmental 
consideration, is at a lower level than the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency 
when the liability costs are sufficiently estimated and leads to a steady state of high 
environmental consideration. 
As indicated in Figure 3, given Sph < S0 < Spl, with regard to the case of sufficient estimation 
of liability costs for environmental damages, from the result of 3), the initial value of the 


















Figure 3. Initial values of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency under Sph < S0 < Spl 
for both sufficient and insufficient estimations of liability costs for environmental damages. 
Figure 4. Initial values of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency under Spl < S0 < S2 
for both sufficient and insufficient estimations of liability costs for environmental damages. 
set within the range of ph < h0
~  < 3. On the other hand, given Sph < S0 < Spl, concerning the case 
of insufficient estimation of liability costs, from the result of (i), the initial value of the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the steady state solution can be set within 
the range of 4 < l0
~  < pl. As seen in Figure 3, we can identify 4 < 0l < pl < ph < h0
~  < 3. 
From transitivity, l0
~  < 0h. That is to say, when sufficient liability costs for environmental 
damages are covered, the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency that leads to the 
steady state of high environmental consideration, is at a higher level than the initial optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency when the liability costs are insufficiently estimated 
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In Figure 4, S2 represents the stock of accumulative pollutants at the steady state with 
insufficient estimation of liability cost (Dp = Dl) and at the level of environmental regulation 
stringency (ph)obtained under the steady state of the stock of accumulative pollutants 
( 0S ) and the steady state with sufficient estimation of liability costs (Dp = Dh). 
As shown in Figure 4, given Spl < S0 < S2, as for the case of sufficient estimation of liability 
costs for environmental damages, from the result of (iii), the initial value of the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the steady state solution can be set within 
the range of ph < h0
~  < 5. On the other hand, given Spl < S0 < S2, concerning the case of 
insufficient estimation of liability costs, from the result of (iii), the initial value of the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the steady state solution can be set within 
the range of pl < l0
~  < 6. As indicated in Figure 4, we are able to identify pl < l0
~  < 6 < ph 
< h0
~  < 5. From transitivity, l0
~ < h0
~ . In other words, when sufficient liability costs for 
environmental damages are covered, the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency 
that leads to the steady state of high environmental consideration, is at a higher level than the 
initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency when the liability cost is insufficiently 
estimated which leads to a steady state of low environmental consideration. 
To summarize these results, given S1 < S0 < S2, when sufficient liability costs for 
environmental damages are covered, the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency 
that leads to the steady state of high environmental consideration, is at a higher level than the 
initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency when the liability cost is insufficiently 
estimated which leads to a steady state of low environmental consideration. Accordingly, 
when insufficient liability cost for environmental damages are covered, the initial optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency that leads to the steady state of low environmental 
consideration, is at a lower level than the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency 
when the liability cost is sufficiently estimated which leads to a steady state of high 
environmental consideration. 
STEADY STATE COMPARISON BETWEEN SUFFICIENT AND INSUFFICIENT 
DISCOUNT RATES FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS 
Next, in this section, we will compare the steady state in the case of a discount rate with 
sufficient consideration for future generations with the steady state in the case of a discount 
rate with insufficient consideration. Here, with respect to the discount rate with insufficient 
consideration for future generations, we define it as rq = rh. On the other hand, with regards to 
the discount rate with sufficient consideration for future generations, we define it as rq = rl. 
When future generations are not adequately considered, there is the tendency that 
environmental costs along with human activities including economic activities are not 
sufficiently estimated and the discount rate is relatively high. On the other hand, when future 
generations are adequately considered, there is the tendency that environmental costs along 
with human activities including economic activities are sufficiently estimated and the 
discount rate is low. Hence,  
 .lh rr   (15) 















Since this section and the next section only focuses on the differences between the cases with 
discount rates with sufficient consideration for future generation and the discount rate with 
insufficient consideration, for convenience, it assumes that the function concerning the 
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estimation of liability costs for environmental damages are identical for both cases. Hence, 
from (12) and (16), we can draw Figure 5. 
In Figure 5, 𝑆qh represents the stock of accumulative pollutants at the steady state when the 
discount rate for future generations is sufficient and 𝑆ql indicates the stock of accumulative 
pollutants at the steady state when the discount rate for future generations is insufficient. As 
seen in Figure 5, we can find that in the case of environmental costs estimated adopting a 
discount rate with sufficient consideration for future generations, the steady state value of the 
optimal environmental regulatory stringency are higher, and the stock of accumulative 
pollutants are lower, than compared with the case of environmental costs estimated adopting 
a discount rate with insufficient consideration for future generations. That is, this could be 
regarded as the steady state solution of high environmental consideration. Accordingly, in the 
case of a discount rate with insufficient consideration for future generations, the steady state 
value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency are lower, and the stock of 
accumulative pollutants are higher, than compared with the case of a discount rate with 
sufficient consideration for future generations. Hence, they could be interpreted as the steady 
state solution of low environmental consideration. 
Figure 5. Steady state solutions in the case of a discount rate with sufficient consideration for 
future generations and in the case of a discount rate with insufficient consideration. 
From the previous results, we can find that the results of the case of sufficient estimation of 
liability costs for environmental damages is similar to the results of the case of a discount rate 
with sufficient consideration of future generations. We can also find that the results of the 
case of insufficient estimation of liability costs for environmental damages is similar to the 
results of the case of a discount rate with insufficient consideration for future generations. 
DIFFERENCE IN THE INITIAL VALUE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
– COMPARING SUFFICIENT AND INSUFFICIENT DISCOUNT RATES FOR FUTURE 
GENERATIONS 
Next, in this section, similar to analysis on the consideration of liability costs for 
environmental damages, under the condition that the initial value of the stock of accumulative 
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environmental regulatory stringency in the case of a discount rate with sufficient 
consideration for future generations differs from the initial value of optimal environmental 
regulatory stringency in the case of a discount rate with insufficient consideration. 
In Figure 6, S11 represents the stock of accumulative pollutants at the steady state with 
sufficient consideration for future generations (rq = rl) and at the level of environmental 
regulations stringency (ql) obtained under the steady state of the stock of accumulative 
pollutants ( 0S ) and the steady state with insufficient consideration for future generations 
(rq = rh). As seen in Figure 6, given S11 < S0 < Sqh, concerning the case of a discount rate with 
sufficient consideration for future generations, from the result of 1), the initial value of the 
optimal environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the steady state solution can be 
set within the range of 11 < h0̂  < qh. On the other hand, given S11 < S0 < Sqh, concerning the 
case of a discount rate with insufficient consideration for future generations, from the result 
of 1), the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the 
steady state solution can be set within the range of 12 < l0̂  < ql. From Figure 6, we can 
confirm 12 < l0̂  < ql < 11 < h0̂  < qh. From transitivity, l0̂  < .ˆ0h  That is, when the 
discount rate is adopted, sufficiently considering future generations, the initial optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency that leads to the steady state of high environmental 
consideration, is at a higher level than the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency 
when the discount rate is adopted with insufficient consideration of future generations and 
leads to a steady state of low environmental consideration. 
From these results, the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency in the 
case of a discount rate with sufficient consideration of future generations and in the case of a 
discount rate with insufficient consideration under S11 < S0 < Sqh, corresponds with the trend 
of the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency in the case of sufficient 
liability for environmental damages and in the case of insufficient liability costs for 
environmental damages under S1 < S0 < Sph. 
Figure 6. Initial values of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency under 



















As indicated in Figure 7, given Sqh < S0 < Sql, with respect to the case of a discount rate with 
sufficient consideration of future generations, from the result of 3), the initial value of the 
optimal environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the steady state solution can be 
set within the range of .ˆ 130   hqh  On the other hand, given Sqh < S0 < Sql, concerning the 
case of a discount rate with insufficient consideration of future generations, from the result of 
1), the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the 
steady state solution can be set within the range of .0̂14 qll    As found in Figure 7, we 
are able to see  qll  014 ˆ .ˆ 130   hqh  From transitivity, .ˆˆ 00 hl   That is to say, when 
discount rate is adopted, sufficiently considering future generations, the initial optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency that leads to the steady state of high environmental 
consideration, is at a higher level than the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency 
when the discount rate is adopted with insufficient consideration for future generations which 
leads to a steady state of low environmental consideration. 
From these results, the initial values of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency in the 
case of a discount rate with sufficient consideration of future generations and in the case of a 
discount rate with insufficient consideration under Sqh < S0 < Sql, corresponds to the initial 
values of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency in the case of a sufficient 
estimation of liability costs for environmental damages and in the case of an insufficient 
estimation under Sph < S0 < Spl. 
In Figure 8, S12 represents the stock of accumulative pollutants at the steady state with 
insufficient consideration for future generations (rq = rh) and at the level of environmental 
regulations stringency (qh) obtained under the steady state of the stock of accumulative 
pollutants ( 0S ) and the steady state with sufficient consideration for future generations 
(rq = rl). As shown in Figure 8, given Sql < S0 < S12, as for the case of a discount rate with 
sufficient consideration for future generations, from the result of 3), the initial value of the 
optimal environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the steady state solution can be 
set within the range of .ˆ 150   hqh  On the other hand, given Sql < S0 < S12, concerning the 
case of a discount rate with insufficient consideration of future generations, from the result of 
3), the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency which leads to the 
steady state solution can be set within the range of .ˆ 160   lql  Through Figure 8, we can 
find out  160̂  lql .ˆ 150   hqh  From transitivity, .ˆˆ 00 hl    In other words, when the 
discount rate is adopted, sufficiently considering future generations, the initial optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency that leads to the steady state of high environmental 
consideration, is at a higher level than the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency 
when the discount rate is adopted with insufficient consideration of future generations which 
leads to a steady state of low environmental consideration. 
From these results, the initial values of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency in the 
case of a discount rate with sufficient consideration of future generations and in the case of a 
discount rate with insufficient consideration under Sql < S0 < S12, corresponds to the initial 
values of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency in the case of a sufficient 
estimation of liability costs for environmental damages and in the case of an insufficient 
estimation under Spl < S0 < S2. To summarize the results, given S11 < S0 < S12 when the 
discount rate with sufficient consideration of future generations is adopted, the initial optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency that leads to the steady state of high environmental 
consideration, is at a higher level than the initial optimal environmental regulatory stringency 
when the adopted discount rate is high and leads to a steady state of low environmental 
consideration. 
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Figure 7. Initial values of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency under Sqh < S0 < Sql 
for both discount rates with sufficient and insufficient consideration for future generations. 
Figure 8. Initial values of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency under Sql < S0 < S12 
for both discount rates with sufficient and insufficient consideration for future generations. 
From the results described, the case of a discount rate with sufficient consideration of future 
generations is similar to the case of sufficient estimation of liability costs for environmental 
damages. Accordingly, the case of a discount rate with insufficient consideration of future 
generations corresponds to the case of insufficient estimation of liability costs for 
environmental damages. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Along with the expansion of economic activities, accumulative pollution such as global 


































concern, environmental costs which include the liability costs of environmental damages and 
abatement costs will be required and it will be important to understand the social preference 
towards such environmental costs. 
Therefore, this article examines the impacts the difference in social preference towards 
environmental costs have on the steady state solution of the stock of accumulative pollutants 
and the optimal environmental regulatory stringency. Furthermore, this article analyses the 
difference in terms of the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency, 
depending on the social preference towards environmental costs. 
The results find that the steady state value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency 
was higher, and the steady state value of the stock of the accumulative pollutants was lower 
in the case when the estimation of the liability costs for environmental damages was 
sufficient, compared to when the estimation was insufficient. This article also finds that the 
steady state value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency was higher, and the 
steady state value of the stock of accumulative pollutants was lower in the case when the 
discount rate adopted took sufficient consideration for future generations, than compared to 
the adoption of a discount rate with insufficient consideration. These results indicate that in 
the case of high social preference towards addressing environmental issues accepting 
environmental costs, we can find the convergence of the steady state solution with high 
environmental consideration where the optimal environmental regulatory stringency is higher 
and the stock of accumulative pollutants is lower, than compared with the case of low social 
preference towards costs concerning environmental issues. Accordingly, as in the case of 
insufficient estimation of the liability for environmental damages and the case with the 
adoption of a discount rate with insufficient consideration for future generations where there is 
low social preference towards costs concerning environmental issues, we find the convergence 
of the steady state solution with low environmental consideration where the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency is lower and the stock of accumulative pollutants is 
higher, than compared with the case of high social preference towards costs to address 
environmental issues. Therefore, it is desirable to conduct policies to encourage a shift 
towards the social preference to address environmental issues and accepting the environmental 
costs. For example, it would be necessary to promote educational activities to penetrate the 
concept of intergenerational equity and the intrinsic values of the environment, and promote 
the concept and measures of environmental accounting to companies and public organizations. 
The results indicate that the steady state solution converges at a higher state of environmental 
consideration if society sufficiently estimates the liability costs for environmental damages, 
and/or adopts discount rates with sufficient consideration of future generations. When aiming 
to achieve such a steady state of high environmental consideration and the initial value of the 
stock of accumulative pollutants are within a given range, the initial value of the stringency 
of environmental regulations are set much higher than when society is not aiming for such a 
high environmental consideration and converges to a steady state of low consideration. 
Hence, in order to support the convergence it would be necessary to establish appropriate 
systems and/or institutions. For instance, the gathering and accessibility of information and 
an objective monitoring system would be required to support society to make well informed 
decisions. Here, we will refer to the shortcoming of this study. Given that S0 < S1 and S2 < S0, 
the possible range of the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency that 
converges to a steady state solution for the case of a sufficient estimate of liability costs for 
environmental damages, partially overlaps with the possible range of the initial value of the 
optimal environmental regulatory stringency for the case of an insufficient estimation of 
liability costs. Hence, it would be uncertain if the initial value of the optimal environmental 
regulatory stringency in the case of a sufficient estimation of liability costs is higher than that 
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in the case of an insufficient estimation. It would depend on the function of abatement costs 
and/or of liability costs for environmental damages in the case of those sufficiently estimated 
and in the case of those insufficiently estimated. Given that S0 < S11 and S12 < S0 the possible 
range of the initial value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency that converges to 
a steady state solution in the case of the adoption of a discount rate with sufficient 
consideration of future generations partially overlaps with the possible range of the initial 
value of the optimal environmental regulatory stringency when a discount rate with 
insufficient consideration is adopted. Hence, it would be uncertain if the initial value of the 
optimal environmental regulatory stringency in the case of a discount rate with sufficient 
consideration for future generations is higher than that of the case of a discount rate with 
insufficient consideration. It would depend on the difference between the discount rate of 
sufficient and insufficient consideration of future generations, or the function of the 
abatement costs and/or of liability costs for environmental damage. Hence, this would be a 
possible area for future studies. 
From the previous results, the steady state solution of the stock of accumulative pollutants 
and the optimal environmental regulatory stringency, and the initial value of the optimal 
environmental regulatory stringency depend on social preference toward environmental costs 
to address environmental issues. Therefore, it could lead to the establishment of a more 
sustainable society, by conducting the appropriate policies based on these results. 
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